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Abstract (100 words) 
We explore empirically how households insure themselves against consumption 
volatility. We asked households how they would fund an unexpected emergency 
consumption expense equivalent to one month’s income. Answers reveal a range of 
consumption insurance mechanisms, including borrowing from credit markets and 
social networks. Despite this, more than one fifth of households have no plan to 
insure their consumption. The likelihood of non-insurance increases with poor 
financial literacy and is highest among households most at risk of experiencing a 
financial shock. Among these households we see large effects of poor financial 
literacy on non-insurance.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the existence of incomplete markets households are unable to perfectly insure 
their consumption (Bewley, 1977). A large theoretical literature explores the implications of 
incomplete markets for household behaviour and welfare, including how households can find 
consumption insurance through saving (Aiyagari, 1994; Carroll, 1997), family labour supply 
(Blundell et al., 2008, 2016; Attanasio et al., 2005), social security provision (Conesa and 
Krueger, 1999; Storesletten et al., 1999; Golosov et al., 2016) and transfers from within social 
networks (Ambrus et al., 2014).  
Do households have insurance against shocks in practice? Many studies address this 
question by documenting the wide distribution of financial assets and saving across the 
population that might be held as self-insurance (Krusell and Smith, Jr., 1998; Carroll and 
Samwick, 1998; Huggett, 1996; Hurst et al., 2010). However, theory emphasises the variety of 
mechanisms through which households can manage shocks apart from a buffer of assets. Some 
mechanisms, such as borrowing from credit markets or transfer from social networks, might 
fall under the radar of empirical analysis based on household balance sheets.  
In this paper we shed new light on how households insure themselves against shocks. 
We use survey data from a representative sample of households which includes information on 
the degree of the household’s consumption insurance by asking households how they would 
cover an emergency expense equal to one month’s income. We uncover broad heterogeneity 
in insurance plans. While approximately half of consumers state they would use existing 
deposits or savings, one quarter would borrow either from the credit market or from within 
their social network. One fifth of households have no plan to fund their consumption. 
We make three new contributions to understanding this heterogeneity in how 
households find insurance. First, we show that life-cycle characteristics are strong determinants 
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of the insurance mechanism households plan to draw upon in emergencies. Older, retired 
households who are asset rich tend to insure through savings and deposits. Younger households 
with lower net worth and higher credit holdings tend to insure through borrowing, using either 
additional formal credit or borrowing from their social network. While this pattern is perhaps 
unsurprising, it casts doubt on validity of the commonly used approach of measuring ‘financial 
fragility’ using calculations based on indebtedness often used in the literature (Caner and 
Wolff, 2004; Adams and West, 2015; Brunetti et al., 2012; Brown and Taylor, 2008). 
Second, our main contribution is to explore the behavioural determinants of the type of 
insurance used by households. We use a range of survey instruments to measure financial 
literacy, attitudes to risk, patience and present bias. To implement these we use established 
methods for measuring behavioural traits in household surveys (Vischer et al., 2013; Dohmen 
et al., 2010; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014a). In regression estimates a one-unit reduction in 
financial literacy on our four-point index raises the likelihood of the household not having a 
plan to fund an emergency expense by 15%. This effect is large, equivalent to a two standard 
deviation decrease in risk aversion. 
Our third contribution is to examine heterogeneity in insurance across households by 
their exposure to risk.  We show that poor financial literacy is a stronger predictor of having 
no plan among this group of particularly high-risk households, showing that private 
consumption insurance is inefficiently distributed across households. One additional reason 
why households may be unprepared for an emergency expense is that they have recently 
incurred an emergency, depleting their source of insurance (e.g. run down their buffer of 
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savings or exhausted transfers from within their social network).3 We find our main results 
hold when controlling for such shocks.  
Our findings also relate to the growing recent literature on household financial stability, 
which has sought to go beyond wealth-based measures of internal insurance. Brunetti et al. 
(2016) propose an alternative measure of financial fragility based on available income and 
wealth portfolio characteristics. Jappelli et al. (2013) propose an aggregate measure of financial 
fragility  based on the sensitivity of bankruptcies to aggregate shocks. Our approach is closest 
to that of Lusardi et al. (2011) who use a similar survey question to the one used in this paper 
to evaluate the ‘financial fragility’ of US households. They find that approximately one quarter 
of US households have no plan to meet an emergency expense.  
 To our knowledge, ours is the first study to examine the relationship between financial 
literacy (plus other behavioural characteristics) and household consumption insurance. In 
particular, our findings cast new light on another source of detriment to consumers arising from 
poor financial literacy, adding to prior studies (Disney and Gathergood, 2013; Lusardi and 
Mitchell, 2007a; Gerardi et al., 2013; Gathergood and Weber, 2017; Lusardi and Mitchell, 
2007b; van Rooij et al., 2011; Gaudecker, 2015). More broadly, this paper relates to the 
growing household finance literature (Campbell, 2006; Campbell et al., 2011; Tufano et al., 
2006).  
The approach we adopt of using self-reported responses to a survey question has several 
advantages. Firstly, households may have important private information about the mechanisms 
they can use to manage shocks. Secondly, we are able to identify a set of households who 
explicitly state that they have no plan, or do not know what plan they would. Thirdly, our 
                                                          
3 In standard buffer-stock models of saving behaviour, households take time to rebuild their buffers of 
assets after incurring a financial shock (Carroll, 1997). 
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survey setting allows us to add a rich set of variables which measure financial literacy and 
behavioural characteristics to our dataset.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our survey design and 
measures of consumption insurance, financial literacy and behavioural characteristics. In 
Section 3 we present our main results including econometric analysis. Section 4 concludes the 
paper. 
II. SURVEY DESIGN AND DATA  
Data 
 We commissioned the addition of our supplementary questions to a regular survey of 
UK households undertaken quarterly by the London-based market research firm YouGov. One 
of the authors of this paper has used YouGov survey data in earlier studies on financial literacy 
and household behaviour (including consumer credit choices in Disney and Gathergood, 2013; 
and mortgage choices in Gathergood and Weber, 2017). YouGov has access to a panel of 
350,000 households and draws a sample of approximately 2,000 households for each quarterly 
wave of the Debt Tracker survey4. We use the August 2013 wave. The survey is administered 
online and achieves a representative sample by making special provision for respondents who 
do not have access to the internet. 
 
 
                                                          
4 The YouGov Debt Tracker surveys a representative sample of the UK population, i.e. England, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Subjects are recruited from the YouGov panel, with the target 
sample stratified to represent the UK population by age, gender, homeownership and employment 
status. The survey achieves an 80% response rate. Respondents are paid £10 for participation in the 
survey, which takes approximately 45 minutes to complete. Further details on the survey are provided 
at https://yougov.co.uk/find-solutions/reports/trackers/debt.  
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Consumption Insurance Survey Question 
We designed the following survey question to measure the consumption insurance of 
respondent households: “Please imagine you had to pay for an unexpected major purchase 
equivalent to your monthly household income. How would you find the money to meet such an 
expense?  
Draw money from current account (excluding any overdraft facility);  
Use existing savings/investments;  
Borrow the money (including use of an overdraft);  
Get help from family/friends;  
Some other way (e.g. sell something, earn extra money, cut spending);  
Would not be able to find the money;  
Don’t know”. 
The question is designed to measure the household’s ability to come up with sufficient 
funds to cover a one-time emergency expense. The advantage of using this approach to 
measuring consumption insurance based upon self-report is that it does not depend upon the 
researcher constructing an objective measure of the extent to which a household is insured 
against shocks (such as a ratio of debt to income). These types of measures might neglect 
private information about ability to find emergency monies, such as transfers or borrowing 
available from within social networks such as family, colleagues and friends.  
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This question we use above is similar to that used by Lusardi et al. (2011) but has two 
modifications5. First, we specify the amount of funds required in an emergency as ‘equivalent 
to your monthly income’ whereas Lusardi et al. (2011) state a specific value ($2,000). The 
motivation for our approach comes from the recent literature emphasises that households tend 
to develop consumption commitments in line with their long-run income (i.e. permanent 
income), such as the recent models of Chetty and Szeidl (2007; 2016). Hence phrasing the 
question in terms of monthly income avoids a mechanical relationship between the ability to 
service a fixed monetary value of emergency expense and income simply because the monetary 
value understates the level of emergency expenditure likely to be faced by a higher income 
household.  
Second, we do not stipulate a time period within which the emergency funds need to be 
sourced, whereas Lusardi et al. (2011) state ‘within the next month’. We omit this extra clause 
because in our UK context the frequency of salary payments differs across workers by 
occupation and the stipulation of ‘one month’ might fall just outside, or just within, the time 
horizon to next salary payment.  
Measures of Financial Literacy and Behavioural Characteristics 
 We also include in the survey a set of questions that measure individual financial 
literacy and behavioural characteristics. For an extensive review of the range of financial 
literacy measures used in the prior literature see Lusardi and Mitchell (2014b). We include 
three questions which measure distinct concepts i) loan maturity (whether total interest 
payments are higher on a 15-year loan or a 30-year loan where each loan has the same principal 
and interest rate), ii) a simple interest calculation (6% of £50,000), and iii) a compound interest 
                                                          
5 The exact question used in Lusardi et al. (2011) is: ‘“If you were to face a $2,000 unexpected expense 
in the next month, how would you get the funds you need?”’. 
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calculation (whether a debt of £100,000 at a 5% interest rate grows to less, equal to, or more 
than £125,000 after five years), and finally6.  
We base our measures of behavioural characteristics on survey questions developed in 
the recent literature on elicitation of behavioural characteristics in survey settings (Vischer et 
al., 2013; Ameriks et al., 2007; Dohmen et al., 2010, 2011; Burks et al., 2012). First our 
measure of risk attitude is based on a question developed by Dohmen et al. (2010): “How do 
you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to 
avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: ‘unwilling to take 
risks’ and the value 10 means: ‘fully prepared to take risk’.” Second, we elicit patience, using 
a widely used short-format question to proxy for patience as described in Dohmen et al. (2010). 
The question is: “How do you see yourself: are you generally an impatient person, or someone 
who always shows great patience? Answers are coded on an 11-point scale, with 0 referring to 
‘very impatient’ and 10 to ‘very patient’.” 
  Third, we elicit present bias. Does patience differ from present bias? In Laibson (1997) 
the rate of long-run time preference is independent of the near-term discount rate. Recent 
studies have shown that the distinction between present bias and patience is important in 
explaining a variety of financial decisions (Gathergood, 2012; Gathergood and Weber, 2014; 
Meier and Sprenger, 2013, 2010). We elicit present bias using Likert scale responses, by which 
                                                          
6 The specific questions we used are as follows: 1) Suppose a 15-year mortgage and a 30-year mortgage 
have the same Annual Percentage Rate and the same amount borrowed. The total amount repaid will 
be: i) Higher for the 15-year mortgage; ii) Higher for the 30-year mortgage; iii) The total amount repaid 
on both mortgages will be the same; iv) Don’t know. 2) Suppose you owe £50,000 on a mortgage at an 
Annual Percentage Rate of 6%. If you didn’t make any payments on this mortgage how much would 
you owe in total after one year? i) Less than £50,000; ii) £50,000 - £54,999; iii) £55,000 - £59,999; iv) 
£60,000 - £64,999; v) More than £65,000; vi) Don’t know. 3) Suppose you owe £100,000 on a mortgage 
at an Annual Percentage Rate of 5%. If you didn’t make any payments on this mortgage how much 
would you owe in total after five years? i) Less than £120,000; ii) Between £120,000 and £125,000; iii) 
More than £125,000; iv) Don’t know 
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respondents associate themselves in varying degrees with a short statement: “I am impulsive 
and tend to buy things even when I can’t really afford them.” From answers to this question 
create a binary variable that we label ‘Present biased’, taking the value of one if the respondent 
answers ‘tend to agree’ or ‘agree strongly’ and zero.  
Summary Data 
Summary data for our sample of 2,036 respondents is shown in Table 1. These summary 
statistics from the YouGov data closely match those for from much larger official survey 
samples representative of the UK population, such as the Wealth and Assets survey7. In our 
sample, half of the respondents are male, with close to two-thirds married, or living with a 
partner, and one in ten divorced. Among the 40% of the sample with unsecured debts, average 
debt is approximately £8,400 pounds and among the 45% with non-zero savings, average 
savings is close to £10,000.  
On average respondents answered 1.66 of the financial literacy questions correctly, with 
the proportion of respondents answering correcting noticeably lower for the later, more 
complex, questions requiring an interest calculation and understanding of compound interest. 
Less than half of the sample answered the compound interest question correctly. Most 
respondents tend slightly towards reporting patience, with a mean score of 5.84 on the 0-10 
scale. Respondents on average tend towards risk aversion (with the average willingness to take 
risks on the 10-point scale of 4.25). In the sample 12% of respondents report that they ‘agree’ 
or ‘strongly agree’ that they are impulsive in their spending decisions.  
 
                                                          
7 For a more detailed comparison of the YouGov DebtTrack survey and Wealth and Assets Survey see 
Gathergood and Weber (2017) 
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III. RESULTS 
Consumption Insurance in the Survey Sample 
We begin our results by showing a summary of responses to the consumption insurance 
question in Table 2. We can summarize responses by constructing four main categories: i) those 
who would use deposits / savings (the first two answer options); ii) those who would borrow 
either formally or informally (the third and fourth answer options), iii) those with some other 
plan not listed in the available options and, iv) those who would not be able to find the money 
or do not know how they would find the money.  
Approximately half of respondents reported that they would be able to find funds to 
meet the emergency expense from their existing deposit or savings, with 8% reporting they 
would use funds in their deposit account and a further 44% reporting they would use savings 
or investments. Approximately 21% answered that they would borrow in some form - with 
11% intending to use a formal borrowing product and 10% stating that they would receive help 
from their social network of family of friends (which does not necessarily imply borrowing). 
A further 7% state they would find the money some other way. One fifth of respondents can 
offer no specific plan - citing that they would not be able to find the money (11%) or do not 
know where they would find the money (9%). This proportion is similar to that in Lusardi et 
al. (2011), who find that approximately one quarter of households sate they could not come up 
with $2,000 within 30 days. 
What explains this variation in responses? We see a clear pattern that reliance on assets 
versus borrowing as a source of funds to meet the emergency expense correlates with life-cycle 
characteristics (for full results see Table A1). Respondents in the deposits / savings category 
are typically older (53% are aged over 55, compared with 16% in the borrow group), more 
likely retired (37% compared with 7%), own their own homes (80% compared with 54%), hold 
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higher levels of savings (£18,200 compared with £1,400) and have higher incomes (£38,700 
compared with £33,000). One implication of these patterns is that measures of available 
consumption insurance based on observed balance sheet positions, such as low financial assets, 
high levels of debt, or high levels of debt relative to income, might be unreliable reflections of 
a household's actual ability to cope with financial shocks. Young, higher debt households will 
have more access to credit due to their rising future income, allowing them to smooth through 
shocks. 
Households in the unable / do not know group exhibit no clear differences life-cycle 
group characteristics compared with the other groups. Their age profile broadly matches that 
of the population (seen in Table 1), as does their balance of males (52% compared with 50% 
in the whole sample), marital status (58% married, compared with 64%) employment (58% 
compared with 61%) and proportion retired (22% compared with 26%). However, these 
households are poorer than the sample average in their household annual income (£26,200 
compared with £34,300) and hold markedly lower savings (£540 compared with £10,000).   
Table 2 shows that the groups also differ in their average behavioural characteristics. 
Respondents with unable / do not know group have notably lower financial literacy, on average 
answering only 1.19 of the questions correctly compared with a score of 1.88 among the 
deposits / savings group, a difference of more than one standard deviation. Among those in the 
unable / do not know group fewer than one third answering the compound interest question 
correctly, compared with close to one half of those in the deposits / savings group. Individuals 
in the borrow group also show much higher self-reported tendencies towards present bias.  
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Multivariate Regression Estimates 
 Our main interest is in estimating the effect of behavioural characteristics upon 
consumption insurance. To do so we use a series of multivariate probit regressions, which take 
the general form: 
Pr(Y = 1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐿 + 𝛽2𝐵 + 𝛽3𝐗
′   (Equation 1) 
where Y is a 1/0 indicator variable denoting the response of the individual to the consumption 
insurance survey question, FL is the financial literacy index on a 4-point scale, B is a vector of 
behavioural characteristics (risk attitude (0-10 scale), patience (0-10 scale) and present bias 
(1/0 indicator variable) as explained earlier and  𝐗′ is a vector of socio-economic control 
variables shown in Table 1. In our main analysis we estimate models in which the dependent 
variables are, variously, indicators for the main category answers to the consumption insurance 
question: i) deposits / savings; ii) borrow; iii) other, iv) unable / do not know. We estimate 
coefficient values and calculate averaged marginal effects. We adopt this approach for ease of 
interpretation of the marginal effects. An alternative approach would be to estimate a 
multinomial probit or logit models (as the answer categories have no natural ordering). When 
we do so the models return very similar results to those from Equation 1 above.  
 Estimates of our main empirical specification are shown in Tables 3-6. In Table 3 the 
dependent variable in each column is a 1/0 indicator variable, taking a value of 1 for deposits / 
savings and a value of 0 otherwise. Column 1 shows results from a model containing only 
demographic and socio-economic variables. Coefficient estimates confirm the broad life-cycle 
pattern of responses: there are positive and statistically significant coefficients on the oldest 
age group, the individual’s education leaving age, whether the individual is retired, and whether 
the individual is a home owner. In Column 2 the likelihood of savings / deposit answers 
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increases with household income and savings, and decreases with the level of debt, as we would 
expect. 
 In Column 3 each of the behavioural characteristics variables are statistically significant 
(though the coefficient on the financial literacy variable is statistically significant at only the 
5% level). The marginal effects imply that a one-unit increase in financial literacy increases 
the likelihood of the dependent variable taking a value of 1 by 3.8 percentage points. Against 
a baseline predicted probability from the model of 0.52, this equates to a 7.3% increase. The 
coefficient on the present bias indicator variable is particularly strong, implying an individual 
who is present biased is 25.4 percentage points, or 49.0% less likely to be in the deposits / 
savings category. This effect is equivalent to that of 5-point reduction in patience (two standard 
deviations) or a 3-point increase in risk aversion (one and a half standard deviations).  
 Table 4 shows results from models in which the dependent variable is an indicator for 
whether the individual would borrow in response to the financial shock. For socio-economic 
and financial characteristics, the pattern in the coefficient estimates is the opposite of that in 
Table 3: older individuals are less likely to borrow in response to the shock, as are those retired, 
with more education, higher income, more debt (secured or unsecured) and lower-savings. 
Notably, the propensity to borrow in response to the shock is increasing in financial literacy. 
The coefficient on the financial literacy variable is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level, implying a one-unit increase raises the likelihood of borrowing by 2.7 percentage 
points, or 13.0%. This further reinforces scepticism of measures of financial fragility based on 
observed levels of debt as, to the extent that intending to borrow to meet emergency expenses 
might also be rational.  
 Table 5 shows results from models in which the dependent variable denotes the ‘other’ 
category. Perhaps unsurprisingly, few coefficients are statistically significant in the regression 
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models as this ‘other’ category is likely to catch a range of means of consumption insurance 
which have a variety of relationships to individual characteristics. The coefficients on 
household income and total savings are both negative, indicating that individuals with higher 
income and savings are less likely to report ‘other’. 
Table 6 shows results from models in which the dependent variable denotes the unable 
/ do not know category. Coefficient values show broad life-cycle patterns in responses: with 
the inclusion of financial controls in Column 2 we see that the propensity to not have a plan 
for meeting the emergency expense decreases with age (the omitted group is the youngest age 
category) and also falls with income and savings, as might be expected. The model estimates 
show that the coefficient on the financial literacy variable is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect of -0.030 implies a one unit reduction in 
financial literacy increases the likelihood of the dependent variable by 3 percentage points, or 
15.0%. This effect is large in comparison with the implied effects from the other behavioural 
characteristics, equivalent to a 3-unit reduction in patience (one standard deviation) or a 5-unit 
increase in risk seeking (more than two standard deviations). The coefficient on the present 
biased dummy variable is not statistically significant, indicating present bias does not predict 
the propensity to not plan for accommodating an emergency expense. 
Extension I: Controlling for Recent Financial Shocks and Borrowing Constraints 
 In additional analysis we also control for recent financial shocks which might have 
affected households in our sample prior to the point of interview and also control for borrowing 
constraints. Both may limit the capacity of households to cope with financial emergencies.8 
                                                          
8 A simple reason for a household having no plan to cope with a financial emergency is that the 
household has recently experienced a financial emergency. The survey data includes information on a 
broad range of financial changes experienced by the household in the six months prior to interview. In 
addition, we construct a measure of binding borrowing constraints based on recent credit refusals. 
Summary data for these variables is shown in Table A3. 
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Results in Online Appendix Tables A4 and A5 show that the patterns in coefficient estimates 
for our main variable of interest are unchanged. 
Extension II: Consumption Insurance across High and Low-Risk Households 
 One explanation for our results could be that some households have a low likelihood of 
facing a financial expense and therefore do not have a plan for meeting an emergency expense. 
We investigate this by categorising households into groups with high and low risk of 
experiencing an emergency expense, and then estimate our main models for both groups.9 
Results show that among the high-risk group the coefficient on the financial literacy variable 
is again negative and statistically significant for the unable / do not know group. Among low-
risk households results show the coefficient on the financial literacy index is again negative 
but with a very small marginal effect more than ten times smaller than the estimates for the 
high-risk group. Hence financial literacy has a stronger effect of non-insurance among higher 
risk households. See Online Appendix Tables A9 – A14 for the detailed estimates. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
In this paper we conduct an exploratory analysis of the mechanisms used by households 
to insure themselves against emergency expenses. We find broad heterogeneity in preparedness 
of households, with one fifth of households holding no plan. Among households with a plan, 
life-cycle characteristics explain some of the heterogeneity in plan choice. Poor financial 
literacy is a strong predictor of the household having no plan to meet an emergency expense. 
                                                          
9 We estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable is a 1/0 indicator variable for whether the 
household experienced any of the financial shocks among the financial shock categories described in 
the previous section (see Online Appendix Table A6). We calculate the predicted likelihood of facing 
a financial shock among households who did not experience a recent shock. Responses to the 
consumption insurance question for high / low risk households (median split) are shown in Online 
Appendix Table A8-A1l. 
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This result holds true when conditioning upon recent financial shocks, and the effect is stronger 
among those households with the highest predicted risk of a future shock. 
Our survey results should be interpreted with the caveats that we ask households about 
a hypothetical scenario, at only one point in time, and that actual responses of households to 
emergency expenses may differ from responses stated in the survey. We do not, for example, 
have natural experiments of exogenous financial shocks which would allow us to compare 
reported vs. actual responses.  
Our findings have two important implications. First, they indicate that poor financial 
literacy contributes to the inability of households to fundamentally smooth their consumption. 
Second, our result that lack of consumption insurance is greatest among those household at 
most risk of a financial shock suggests that private insurance mechanisms are inefficiently 
distributed in the economy.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
mean sd min max
Age
Age 18-24 (=1) 0.05 0.22 0 1
Age 25-34 (=1) 0.17 0.38 0 1
Age 35-44 (=1) 0.18 0.39 0 1
Age 45-54 (=1) 0.19 0.39 0 1
Age 55+ (=1) 0.40 0.49 0 1
Demographics
Male (=1) 0.50 0.50 0 1
Married / Partner (=1) 0.64 0.48 0 1
Divorced / Separated (=1) 0.09 0.28 0 1
Dependent Children (=1) 0.24 0.43 0 1
Education
Age Left Education 18.31 2.67 14 22
Employment
Employed (=1) 0.61 0.49 0 1
Unemployed (=1) 0.03 0.16 0 1
Retired (=1) 0.26 0.44 0 1
Partner Employed (=1) 0.39 0.49 0 1
Home Ownership
Home Owner (=1) 0.67 0.47 0 1
Renter (=1) 0.25 0.43 0 1
Finances
Household Income (£) 34303.04 16261.16 0 86360
Mortgage Debt, >0 (£) 78983.56 55192.64 36 180000
Unsecured Debt, >0 (£) 8421.29 8702.40 10 29800
Total Savings (£) 9945.24 24277.16 0 120000
Financial Literacy
Financial Literacy (0-3) 1.66 1.08 0 3
Loan Maturity Correct (=1) 0.70 0.46 0 1
Simple Interest Correct (=1) 0.55 0.50 0 1
Compound Interest Correct (=1) 0.41 0.49 0 1
Behavioural Characterstics
Patience (0-10) 5.84 2.47 0 10
Risk Attitude (0-10) 4.25 2.41 0 10
Present Biased (= 1) 0.12 0.32 0 1
Observations 2036
Notes: Table reports summary statistics for the survey sample. Age reported in categories. Age left education is age at which the
respondent left full-time education. Annual household income is net income of main respondent and his / her spouse. Mortgage debt is
value of all mortgages secured against property. Unsecured debt is sum of all consumer credit debt outstanding (excluding credit card
balances that are repaid at the end of the cycle). Savings is a measure of liquid savings (see main text for details). Financial literacy is
measured using responses to multiple-choice questions, see main text for details. Behavioral characteristics are measured using survey
instruments described in the main text. 22
Table 2: Responses to Consumption Insurance Survey Question
(a) Summary of Responses
Please imagine you had to pay for an unexpected major purchase
equivalent to your monthly household income.
How would you find the money to meet such an expense? Frequency Percent
Draw money from current account (excluding any overdraft facility) 163 8.01%
Use existing savings/investments 888 43.61%
Borrow the money (including use of an overdraft) 230 11.30%
Get help from family/friends 198 9.72%
Some other way (e.g. sell something, earn extra money, cut spending) 146 7.17%
Would not be able to find the money 221 10.85%
Do not know 190 9.33%
Total 2036 100%
(b) Summary Socio-Economic Characteristics by Response
Deposits / Savings Borrow Other Unable / DK
Financial Literacy
Financial Literacy (0-3) 1.88 1.66 1.42 1.19
Loan Maturity Correct (=1) 0.77 0.71 0.62 0.52
Simple Interest Correct (=1) 0.62 0.54 0.49 0.39
Compound Interest Correct (=1) 0.48 0.41 0.32 0.27
Behavioural Characterstics
Patience (0-10) 5.94 5.78 6.20 5.51
Risk Attitude (0-10) 4.12 4.63 4.51 4.10
Present Biased (= 1) 0.05 0.23 0.14 0.16
Observations 1051 428 146 411
Notes: Table shows breakdown of responses to consumptin insurance survey question. Respondents were asked to state the main way
in which they would find the money (one category only). The order in which the options were presented was randomised across survey
participants.
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Table 3: Regression Results for Consumption Insurance Response: Deposits / Savings
(1) (2) (3)
Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME
Age 25-34 (=1) -0.009 -0.003 0.865*** 0.328*** 1.277*** 0.489***
(0.156) (0.188) (0.204)
Age 35-44 (=1) 0.016 0.006 0.544*** 0.207*** 0.696*** 0.267***
(0.161) (0.192) (0.205)
Age 45-54 (=1) 0.172 0.069 1.292*** 0.490*** 1.686*** 0.645***
(0.162) (0.203) (0.220)
Age 55+ (=1) 0.478*** 0.190*** 1.565*** 0.594*** 1.979*** 0.757***
(0.172) (0.215) (0.234)
Male (=1) 0.070 0.028 -0.606*** -0.230*** -0.750*** -0.287***
(0.060) (0.078) (0.086)
Married / Partner (=1) -0.004 -0.002 -0.355*** -0.135*** -0.601*** -0.230***
(0.094) (0.113) (0.123)
Divorced / Separated (=1) -0.268* -0.107* -0.209 -0.079 -0.176 -0.067
(0.123) (0.144) (0.155)
Dependent Children (=1) -0.374*** -0.149*** -0.547*** -0.208*** -0.622*** -0.238***
(0.080) (0.095) (0.103)
Age Left Education 0.087*** 0.035*** -0.135*** -0.051*** -0.219*** -0.084***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.021)
Employed (=1) 0.034 0.013 -1.572*** -0.597*** -2.066*** -0.791***
(0.105) (0.150) (0.167)
Unemployed (=1) -0.432* -0.172* -0.843*** -0.320*** -0.829*** -0.317***
(0.214) (0.249) (0.263)
Retired (=1) 0.434*** 0.173*** -0.008 -0.003 -0.140 -0.054
(0.127) (0.154) (0.163)
Partner Employed (=1) 0.045 0.018 -1.529*** -0.580*** -2.065*** -0.790***
(0.082) (0.130) (0.150)
Home Owner (=1) 0.535*** 0.213*** 0.755*** 0.287*** 0.815*** 0.312***
(0.122) (0.149) (0.164)
Renter (=1) -0.167 -0.066 1.018*** 0.387*** 1.517*** 0.581***
(0.123) (0.157) (0.178)
Household Income 1.308*** 0.497*** 1.854*** 0.710***
(0.069) (0.090)
Mortgage Debt -0.090*** -0.034*** -0.119*** -0.046***
(0.010) (0.011)
Unsecured Debt -0.242*** -0.092*** -0.267*** -0.102***
(0.056) (0.062)
Total Savings 0.298*** 0.113*** 0.207*** 0.079***
(0.047) (0.050)
Financial Literacy (0-3) 0.098*** 0.038***
(0.038)
Patience (0-10) 0.119*** 0.045***
(0.017)
Risk Attitude (0-10) -0.225*** -0.086***
(0.020)
Present Biased (= 1) -0.663*** -0.254***
(0.131)
Observations 2036 2036 2036
Chi2 388.83 1171.69 1398.14
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Baseline probability 0.5163 0.5161 0.5183
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates, standard errors (in parenthesis) and marginal effects (in adjoining colum) from Probit model
estimates. For definitions of covariates see main text. Averaged marginal effects. Stars denote statistical significance at * 5%, ** 2% and
*** 1% levels.
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Table 4: Regression Results for Consumption Insurance Response: Borrow
(1) (2) (3)
Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME
Age 25-34 (=1) 0.084 0.022 -0.320 -0.067 -0.488*** -0.098***
(0.157) (0.171) (0.177)
Age 35-44 (=1) 0.073 0.019 -0.184 -0.038 -0.293 -0.059
(0.162) (0.175) (0.180)
Age 45-54 (=1) -0.156 -0.041 -0.650*** -0.136*** -0.838*** -0.168***
(0.166) (0.187) (0.193)
Age 55+ (=1) -0.545*** -0.143*** -0.980*** -0.204*** -1.207*** -0.242***
(0.182) (0.203) (0.212)
Male (=1) -0.137* -0.036* 0.182** 0.038** 0.147 0.030
(0.067) (0.076) (0.079)
Married / Partner (=1) -0.147 -0.039 -0.046 -0.010 0.049 0.010
(0.107) (0.114) (0.118)
Divorced / Separated (=1) 0.179 0.047 0.078 0.016 -0.006 -0.001
(0.131) (0.138) (0.142)
Dependent Children (=1) 0.106 0.028 0.154 0.032 0.178* 0.036*
(0.082) (0.087) (0.089)
Age Left Education -0.027 -0.007 0.081*** 0.017*** 0.112*** 0.023***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
Employed (=1) 0.107 0.028 0.838*** 0.175*** 1.026*** 0.206***
(0.110) (0.137) (0.143)
Unemployed (=1) -0.076 -0.020 0.116 0.024 0.173 0.035
(0.212) (0.217) (0.220)
Retired (=1) -0.320* -0.084* -0.020 -0.004 0.089 0.018
(0.152) (0.165) (0.170)
Partner Employed (=1) 0.223** 0.059** 0.959*** 0.200*** 1.196*** 0.240***
(0.095) (0.126) (0.134)
Home Owner (=1) -0.114 -0.030 -0.164 -0.034 -0.143 -0.029
(0.132) (0.144) (0.147)
Renter (=1) 0.185 0.049 -0.320* -0.067* -0.529*** -0.106***
(0.128) (0.144) (0.149)
Household Income -0.582*** -0.121*** -0.809*** -0.162***
(0.057) (0.067)
Mortgage Debt 0.054*** 0.011*** 0.061*** 0.012***
(0.009) (0.010)
Unsecured Debt 0.162*** 0.034*** 0.119** 0.024**
(0.049) (0.050)
Total Savings -0.172*** -0.036*** -0.131*** -0.026***
(0.049) (0.050)
Financial Literacy (0-3) 0.134*** 0.027***
(0.037)
Patience (0-10) -0.030* -0.006*
(0.015)
Risk Attitude (0-10) 0.117*** 0.024***
(0.018)
Present Biased (= 1) 0.405*** 0.081***
(0.099)
Observations 2036 2036 2036
Chi2 208.11 416.39 495.62
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Baseline probability 0.2102 0.2096 0.2088
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates, standard errors (in parenthesis) and marginal effects (in adjoining colum) from Probit model
estimates. For definitions of covariates see main text. Averaged marginal effects. Stars denote statistical significance at * 5%, ** 2% and
*** 1% levels.
25
Table 5: Regression Results for Consumption Insurance Response: Other
(1) Baseline (2) + Financial (3) + Behavioural
Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME
Age 25-34 (=1) 0.114 0.015 -0.038 -0.004 -0.113 -0.011
(0.225) (0.234) (0.238)
Age 35-44 (=1) 0.072 0.009 -0.022 -0.002 -0.068 -0.007
(0.232) (0.242) (0.244)
Age 45-54 (=1) 0.138 0.018 -0.028 -0.003 -0.098 -0.010
(0.232) (0.249) (0.252)
Age 55+ (=1) 0.299 0.039 0.195 0.020 0.105 0.011
(0.244) (0.260) (0.264)
Male (=1) -0.070 -0.009 0.069 0.007 0.076 0.008
(0.086) (0.094) (0.096)
Married / Partner (=1) -0.028 -0.004 0.033 0.003 0.074 0.008
(0.131) (0.136) (0.138)
Divorced / Separated (=1) 0.002 0.000 -0.027 -0.003 -0.036 -0.004
(0.167) (0.169) (0.171)
Dependent Children (=1) 0.149 0.020 0.145 0.015 0.141 0.014
(0.109) (0.112) (0.113)
Age Left Education -0.024 -0.003 0.030 0.003 0.041 0.004
(0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
Employed (=1) -0.076 -0.010 0.171 0.018 0.224 0.023
(0.137) (0.162) (0.166)
Unemployed (=1) -0.339 -0.045 -0.351 -0.036 -0.342 -0.035
(0.303) (0.309) (0.311)
Retired (=1) -0.441** -0.058** -0.345 -0.036 -0.323 -0.033
(0.173) (0.179) (0.181)
Partner Employed (=1) -0.078 -0.010 0.194 0.020 0.227 0.023
(0.117) (0.150) (0.156)
Home Owner (=1) -0.172 -0.023 -0.182 -0.019 -0.154 -0.016
(0.173) (0.181) (0.182)
Renter (=1) -0.010 -0.001 -0.222 -0.023 -0.264 -0.027
(0.169) (0.184) (0.187)
Household Income -0.225*** -0.023*** -0.280*** -0.028***
(0.070) (0.079)
Mortgage Debt 0.023 0.002 0.027* 0.003*
(0.012) (0.013)
Unsecured Debt 0.019 0.002 0.012 0.001
(0.066) (0.067)
Total Savings -0.206*** -0.021*** -0.185** -0.019**
(0.075) (0.075)
Financial Literacy (0-3) -0.045 -0.005
(0.044)
Patience (0-10) 0.013 0.001
(0.019)
Risk Attitude (0-10) 0.049** 0.005**
(0.021)
Present Biased (= 1) -0.003 -0.000
(0.131)
Observations 2036 2036 2036
Chi2 18.88 62.76 71.35
Prob > chi2 0.2192 0.0000 0.0000
Baseline probability 0.0717 0.0717 0.0717
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates, standard errors (in parenthesis) and marginal effects (in adjoining colum) from Probit model
estimates. For definitions of covariates see main text. Averaged marginal effects. Stars denote statistical significance at * 5%, ** 2% and
*** 1% levels.
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Table 6: Regression Results for Consumption Insurance Response: Unable / Do Not Know
(1) Baseline (2) + Financial (3) + Behavioural
Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME
Age 25-34 (=1) -0.161 -0.043 -0.570*** -0.081*** -0.641*** -0.089***
(0.161) (0.174) (0.179)
Age 35-44 (=1) -0.159 -0.043 -0.449** -0.064** -0.449** -0.062**
(0.165) (0.178) (0.182)
Age 45-54 (=1) -0.095 -0.025 -0.620*** -0.088*** -0.631*** -0.087***
(0.167) (0.186) (0.192)
Age 55+ (=1) -0.266 -0.071 -0.704*** -0.100*** -0.681*** -0.094***
(0.180) (0.199) (0.206)
Male (=1) 0.096 0.026 0.427*** 0.061*** 0.567*** 0.078***
(0.066) (0.077) (0.081)
Married / Partner (=1) 0.102 0.027 0.228* 0.033* 0.279** 0.039**
(0.102) (0.110) (0.114)
Divorced / Separated (=1) 0.145 0.039 0.062 0.009 0.092 0.013
(0.130) (0.137) (0.141)
Dependent Children (=1) 0.266*** 0.071*** 0.340*** 0.048*** 0.356*** 0.049***
(0.086) (0.092) (0.094)
Age Left Education -0.076*** -0.020*** 0.037* 0.005* 0.065*** 0.009***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
Employed (=1) -0.095 -0.025 0.645*** 0.092*** 0.733*** 0.101***
(0.109) (0.136) (0.141)
Unemployed (=1) 0.597*** 0.159*** 0.778*** 0.111*** 0.753*** 0.104***
(0.195) (0.204) (0.210)
Retired (=1) -0.167 -0.045 0.154 0.022 0.198 0.027
(0.136) (0.149) (0.152)
Partner Employed (=1) -0.200* -0.054* 0.510*** 0.073*** 0.552*** 0.076***
(0.090) (0.121) (0.127)
Home Owner (=1) -0.514*** -0.137*** -0.492*** -0.070*** -0.484*** -0.067***
(0.128) (0.139) (0.143)
Renter (=1) -0.017 -0.004 -0.572*** -0.082*** -0.636*** -0.088***
(0.125) (0.142) (0.148)
Household Income -0.573*** -0.082*** -0.656*** -0.091***
(0.058) (0.067)
Mortgage Debt 0.021 0.003 0.034*** 0.005***
(0.011) (0.011)
Unsecured Debt 0.051 0.007 0.081 0.011
(0.053) (0.055)
Total Savings -0.560*** -0.080*** -0.508*** -0.070***
(0.100) (0.103)
Financial Literacy (0-3) -0.219*** -0.030***
(0.036)
Patience (0-10) -0.083*** -0.011***
(0.015)
Risk Attitude (0-10) 0.043** 0.006**
(0.017)
Present Biased (= 1) 0.042 0.006
(0.106)
Observations 2036 2036 2036
Chi2 151.42 396.56 466.74
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Baseline probability 0.2017 0.2009 0.2005
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates, standard errors (in parenthesis) and marginal effects (in adjoining colum) from Probit model
estimates. For definitions of covariates see main text. Averaged marginal effects. Stars denote statistical significance at * 5%, ** 2% and
*** 1% levels.
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Additional Tables for Online Supplementary Appendix Only
A28
Table A1: Sample Summary Statistics by Responses to Consumption Insurance Question
Deposits / Savings Borrow Other Unable / DK
Age
Age 18-24 (=1) 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.08
Age 25-34 (=1) 0.13 0.28 0.18 0.18
Age 35-44 (=1) 0.14 0.28 0.18 0.19
Age 45-54 (=1) 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.21
Age 55+ (=1) 0.53 0.16 0.39 0.35
Demographics
Male (=1) 0.52 0.43 0.46 0.52
Married / Partner (=1) 0.70 0.58 0.61 0.58
Divorced / Separated (=1) 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11
Dependent Children (=1) 0.16 0.35 0.29 0.31
Education
Age Left Education 18.46 18.63 18.05 17.71
Employment
Employed (=1) 0.54 0.78 0.65 0.58
Unemployed (=1) 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.07
Retired (=1) 0.37 0.07 0.18 0.22
Partner Employed (=1) 0.38 0.48 0.37 0.32
Home Ownership
Home Owner (=1) 0.80 0.54 0.59 0.48
Renter (=1) 0.14 0.36 0.32 0.39
Finances
Household Income (£) 38682.89 32931.33 29703.70 26165.29
Mortgage Debt, >0 (£) 78076.49 85329.04 71785.88 73679.53
Unsecured Debt, >0 (£) 8285.33 9004.50 6474.47 8704.68
Total Savings (£) 18258.49 1452.17 1475.32 539.92
Observations 1051 428 146 411
Notes: Table reports socio-economic and financial summary statistics by answers to consumption insurance survey question (grouped
into four categories). Age reported in categories. Age left education is age at which the respondent left full-time education. Annual
household income is net income of main respondent and his / her spouse. Mortgage debt is value of all mortgages secured against
property. Unsecured debt is sum of all consumer credit debt outstanding (excluding credit card balances that are repaid at the end of the
cycle). Savings is a measure of liquid savings (see main text for details).
A29
Table A2: Behavioural Variables Summary Statistics by Responses to Consumption Insur-
ance Survey Question, Detailed Categories
Desposits Savings Borrow Family Other Unable DK
Financial Literacy
Financial Literacy (0-3) 1.90 1.87 1.74 1.56 1.42 1.30 1.06
Loan Maturity Correct (=1) 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.44
Simple Interest Correct (=1) 0.62 0.62 0.58 0.50 0.49 0.41 0.38
Compound Interest Correct (=1) 0.48 0.48 0.41 0.40 0.32 0.30 0.25
Behavioural Characterstics
Patience (0-10) 5.92 5.95 5.77 5.80 6.20 5.61 5.40
Risk Attitude (0-10) 4.26 4.09 4.83 4.40 4.51 4.10 4.12
Present Biased (= 1) 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.24 0.14 0.19 0.12
Observations 163 888 230 198 146 221 190
Notes: Table reports summary statistics for responese to financial literacy questions and measures of behavioural characteristics. Finan-
cial literacy is measured using responses to multiple-choice questions, see main text for details. Behavioral characteristics are measured
using survey instruments described in the main text.
A30
Table A3: Recent Shocks Summary Statistics by Responses to Consumption Insurance Survey
Question
(a) Summary Statistics by Answer Categories
Deposits / Savings Borrow Other Unable / DK
Shock - Income Loss 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.09
Shock - Credit Withdrawn 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.11
Shock - Expense 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.13
Borrowing Constrained 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05
Observations 1051 428 146 411
(b) Summary Statistics by Detailed Categories
Desposits Savings Borrow Family Other Unable DK
Shock - Income Loss 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.05
Shock - Credit Withdrawn 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.05
Shock - Expense 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.08
Borrowing Constrained 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.01
Observations 163 888 230 198 146 221 190
Notes: Table reports summary data for proportions of households experiencing recent financial shock by answers to consumption insur-
ance survey questions in categories (top panel) and by full set of answer options (bottom panel)
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Table A4: Extension: Regression Results for Consumption Insurance Responses Adding Con-
trols for Recent Shocks to Income, Expenses and Credit
(1) Save (2) Borrow (3) Other 4) Unable / DK
Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME
Household Income 2.158*** 0.829*** -1.120*** -0.215*** -0.211* -0.021* -0.741*** -0.102***
(0.105) (0.081) (0.091) (0.077)
Mortgage Debt -0.138*** -0.053*** 0.079*** 0.015*** 0.024 0.002 0.038*** 0.005***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Unsecured Debt -0.256*** -0.099*** 0.138*** 0.027*** 0.015 0.002 0.072 0.010
(0.064) (0.052) (0.068) (0.055)
Total Savings 0.141*** 0.054*** -0.063 -0.012 -0.202*** -0.020*** -0.483*** -0.066***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.076) (0.104)
Financial Literacy (0-3) 0.078* 0.030* 0.163*** 0.031*** -0.051 -0.005 -0.213*** -0.029***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.045) (0.036)
Patience (0-10) 0.128*** 0.049*** -0.037** -0.007** 0.014 0.001 -0.084*** -0.012***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
Risk Attitude (0-10) -0.254*** -0.098*** 0.154*** 0.030*** 0.044* 0.004* 0.049*** 0.007***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018)
Present Biased (= 1) -0.686*** -0.263*** 0.444*** 0.085*** 0.009 0.001 0.029 0.004
(0.135) (0.102) (0.132) (0.107)
Shock - Income Loss 1.447*** 0.556*** -1.173*** -0.226*** 0.236 0.024 -0.491*** -0.067***
(0.193) (0.167) (0.171) (0.159)
Shock - Credit Withdrawn -0.499* -0.192* -0.391* -0.075* -0.250 -0.025 0.457*** 0.063***
(0.232) (0.175) (0.212) (0.157)
Shock - Expense 0.209 0.080 -0.153 -0.029 0.173 0.017 -0.095 -0.013
(0.139) (0.126) (0.143) (0.123)
Borrowing Constrained -0.596 -0.229 0.259 0.050 -0.101 -0.010 0.071 0.010
(0.331) (0.202) (0.281) (0.201)
Observations 2036 2036 2036 2036
Chi2 1465.56 561.37 75.99 485.07
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Baseline probability 0.5168 0.2099 0.0717 0.2004
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates, standard errors (in parenthesis) and marginal effects (in adjoining colum) from Probit model
estimates. For definitions of covariates see main text. Averaged marginal effects. Stars denote statistical significance at * 5%, ** 2% and
*** 1% levels.
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Table A5: OLS Regression Results for Consumption Insurance Responses Adding Controls
for Recent Shocks to Income, Expenses and Credit
(1) Save (2) Borrow (3) Other 4)Unable / DK
Household Income 0.473*** -0.263*** -0.031*** -0.179***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016)
Mortgage Debt -0.028*** 0.017*** 0.003 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Unsecured Debt -0.059*** 0.046*** 0.003 0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013)
Total Savings -0.043*** 0.031*** -0.002 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Financial Literacy (0-3) 0.026*** 0.032*** -0.007 -0.052***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Patience (0-10) 0.027*** -0.009*** 0.002 -0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Risk Attitude (0-10) -0.055*** 0.036*** 0.006* 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Present Biased (= 1) -0.151*** 0.137*** 0.003 0.010
(0.025) (0.026) (0.018) (0.026)
Shock - Income Loss 0.335*** -0.274*** 0.052 -0.113***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.027) (0.038)
Shock - Credit Withdrawn -0.054 -0.075 -0.042 0.171***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.029) (0.041)
Shock - Expense 0.047 -0.047 0.031 -0.031
(0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.030)
Borrowing Constrained -0.096 0.073 -0.007 0.030
(0.052) (0.053) (0.038) (0.054)
Observations 2036 2036 2036 2036
F
Prob > F 75.3779 22.4493 2.3532 17.6046
Baseline probability 0.5162 0.2102 0.0717 0.2019
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates, standard errors (in parenthesis) from OLS model estimates. For definitions of covariates see
main text. Stars denote statistical significance at * 5%, ** 2% and *** 1% levels.
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Table A6: Regression Results for Predicted Probability of Any Shock
(1) Any Shock
Beta ME
Age 25-34 (=1) -0.877*** -0.171***
(0.208)
Age 35-44 (=1) -0.472* -0.092*
(0.207)
Age 45-54 (=1) -0.695*** -0.136***
(0.215)
Age 55+ (=1) -0.722*** -0.141***
(0.227)
Male (=1) 0.338*** 0.066***
(0.082)
Married / Partner (=1) 0.437*** 0.085***
(0.117)
Divorced / Separated (=1) -0.095 -0.019
(0.152)
Dependent Children (=1) 0.390*** 0.076***
(0.097)
Age Left Education 0.193*** 0.038***
(0.020)
Employed (=1) 1.236*** 0.241***
(0.149)
Unemployed (=1) 0.331 0.065
(0.250)
Retired (=1) 0.135 0.026
(0.157)
Partner Employed (=1) 1.157*** 0.226***
(0.131)
Home Owner (=1) -0.030 -0.006
(0.163)
Renter (=1) -0.810*** -0.158***
(0.169)
Household Income -1.102*** -0.215***
(0.073)
Mortgage Debt 0.064*** 0.012***
(0.010)
Unsecured Debt 0.068 0.013
(0.056)
Total Savings 0.152*** 0.030***
(0.025)
Financial Literacy (0-3) 0.074 0.014
(0.038)
Patience (0-10) -0.057*** -0.011***
(0.016)
Risk Attitude (0-10) 0.120*** 0.024***
(0.018)
Present Biased (= 1) 0.196 0.038
(0.110)
Observations 2036
Chi2 335.13
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Baseline probability 0.1600
Notes:Table reports coefficient estimates, standard errors (in parenthesis) and mmarginal effects (in adjoining colum) from Probit model
estimates. For definitions of covariates see main text. Averaged marginal effects. Stars denote statistical significance at * 5%, ** 2% and
*** 1% levels.
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Table A7: Responses to Consumption Insurance Survey Questions By High / Low Risk of
Shock
Please imagine you had to pay for an unexpected major purchase
equivalent to your monthly household income.
How would you find the money to meet such an expense? High Risk Group Low Risk Group
Draw money from current account (excluding any overdraft facility) 2.10% 15.42%
Use existing savings/investments 27.10% 65.89%
Borrow the money (including use of an overdraft) 16.36% 4.91%
Get help from family/friends 17.17% 1.99%
Some other way (e.g. sell something, earn extra money, cut spending) 7.71% 4.79%
Would not be able to find the money 14.60% 2.92%
Do not know 14.95% 4.09%
Total 100% 100%
N 856 856
Notes: Table shows breakdown of responses to survey question used to measure consumption insurance by group according to risk of
experiencing a financial shock. Respondents could choose one answer category.
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Table A8: Regression Results for Consumption Insurance Responses: High Risk of Shock
Group
(1) Save (2) Borrow (3) Other (4) Unable / DK
Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME
Household Income 2.117*** 0.640*** -0.972*** -0.326*** 0.247 0.029 -0.313* -0.093*
(0.238) (0.150) (0.204) (0.147)
Mortgage Debt -0.130*** -0.039*** 0.070*** 0.024*** 0.010 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016)
Unsecured Debt -0.236** -0.071** 0.160* 0.054* -0.062 -0.007 0.023 0.007
(0.094) (0.072) (0.099) (0.075)
Total Savings 0.284*** 0.086*** -0.117 -0.039 -0.511* -0.061* -0.479*** -0.142***
(0.088) (0.079) (0.227) (0.122)
Financial Literacy (0-3) 0.021 0.006 0.200*** 0.067*** -0.101 -0.012 -0.202*** -0.060***
(0.059) (0.051) (0.065) (0.049)
Patience (0-10) 0.135*** 0.041*** -0.005 -0.002 0.039 0.005 -0.087*** -0.026***
(0.027) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021)
Risk Attitude (0-10) -0.268*** -0.081*** 0.158*** 0.053*** -0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.036) (0.028) (0.035) (0.026)
Present Biased (= 1) -0.699*** -0.211*** 0.426*** 0.143*** 0.077 0.009 -0.211 -0.062
(0.202) (0.137) (0.177) (0.147)
Observations 856 856 856 856
Chi2 404.18 220.71 24.09 134.40
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.3989 0.0000
Baseline probability 0.5484 0.2204 0.0859 0.2254
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates, standard errors (in parenthesis) and marginal effects (in adjoining colum) from Probit model
estimates. For definitions of covariates see main text. Averaged marginal effects. Stars denote statistical significance at * 5%, ** 2% and
*** 1% levels.
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Table A9: Regression Results for Consumption Insurance Responses: Low Risk of Shock
Group
(1) Save (2) Borrow (3) Other (4) Unable / DK
Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME Beta ME
Household Income 2.444*** 0.087*** -1.253*** -0.017*** -1.545*** -0.033*** -1.838*** -0.004***
(0.297) (0.325) (0.430) (0.381)
Mortgage Debt -0.177*** -0.006*** 0.097*** 0.001*** 0.108*** 0.002*** 0.119*** 0.000***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.037) (0.037)
Unsecured Debt -0.256* -0.009* 0.163 0.002 0.400*** 0.008*** 0.009 0.000
(0.114) (0.132) (0.144) (0.166)
Total Savings 0.336*** 0.012*** -0.409 -0.006 -0.053 -0.001 -0.643* -0.001*
(0.130) (0.220) (0.146) (0.316)
Financial Literacy (0-3) 0.123 0.004 0.031 0.000 -0.057 -0.001 -0.150 -0.000
(0.068) (0.086) (0.098) (0.091)
Patience (0-10) 0.121*** 0.004*** -0.058 -0.001 -0.080 -0.002 -0.105** -0.000**
(0.033) (0.038) (0.046) (0.042)
Risk Attitude (0-10) -0.264*** -0.009*** 0.138** 0.002** 0.156** 0.003** 0.198*** 0.000***
(0.046) (0.054) (0.063) (0.059)
Present Biased (= 1) -0.624** -0.022** 0.422 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.435 0.001
(0.250) (0.266) (0.408) (0.287)
Observations 856 856 833 856
Chi2 358.36 113.42 63.02 187.16
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Baseline probability 0.5542 0.1838 0.1825 0.2482
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates, standard errors (in parenthesis) and marginal effects (in adjoining colum) from Probit model
estimates. For definitions of covariates see main text. Averaged marginal effects. Stars denote statistical significance at * 5%, ** 2% and
*** 1% levels.
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Table A10: OLS Regression Results for Consumption Insurance Responses: High Risk of
Shock Group
(1) Save (2) Borrow (3) Other (4) Unable / DK
Household Income 0.390*** -0.311*** 0.030 -0.108**
(0.039) (0.045) (0.030) (0.046)
Mortgage Debt -0.023*** 0.021*** 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Unsecured Debt -0.059*** 0.063*** -0.008 0.004
(0.019) (0.022) (0.015) (0.023)
Total Savings 0.014 0.022 -0.017* -0.020
(0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
Financial Literacy (0-3) 0.016 0.059*** -0.015 -0.060***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015)
Patience (0-10) 0.024*** -0.002 0.006 -0.028***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Risk Attitude (0-10) -0.050*** 0.048*** -0.000 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Present Biased (= 1) -0.105*** 0.140*** 0.022 -0.056
(0.038) (0.043) (0.029) (0.044)
Observations 856 856 856 856
F 20.46 10.19 0.68 5.06
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.8641 0.0000
Baseline probability 0.5135 0.1825 0.0868 0.2173
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates, standard errors (in parenthesis) OLS model estimates. For definitions of covariates see main
text. Stars denote statistical significance at * 5%, ** 2% and *** 1% levels.
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Table A11: OLS Regression Results for Consumption Insurance Responses: Low Risk of
Shock Group
(1) Save (2) Borrow (3) Other (4) Unable / DK
Household Income 0.403*** -0.131*** -0.089*** -0.183***
(0.039) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029)
Mortgage Debt -0.025*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Unsecured Debt -0.018 0.012 0.033*** -0.026
(0.021) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016)
Total Savings -0.049*** 0.014*** 0.010* 0.025***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Financial Literacy (0-3) 0.034*** -0.000 -0.007 -0.026***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Patience (0-10) 0.020*** -0.006 -0.005 -0.009**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Risk Attitude (0-10) -0.044*** 0.014*** 0.009* 0.021***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Present Biased (= 1) -0.147*** 0.077* -0.001 0.071*
(0.047) (0.035) (0.028) (0.035)
Observations 856 856 856 856
F 17.63 4.56 2.45 9.69
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
Baseline probability 0.6257 0.1258 0.0850 0.1635
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates, standard errors (in parenthesis) from OLS model estimates. For definitions of covariates see
main text. Stars denote statistical significance at * 5%, ** 2% and *** 1% levels.
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